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In September 1922, after more than three years of war in Asia Minor, the Greek
army was defeated by the Nationalist Turkish powers led by Mustafa Kemal. The
atrocities from the part of the Turkish armed forces against the Christian popula-
tions of Asia Minor that followed the retreat of the Greek Army resulted in the
death of hundreds of thousands of people as well as the destruction of many
Christian properties. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Asia Minor,
Pontus, and Eastern Thrace were forced to flee to Greece in order to protect
themselves from Kemal’s advancing Nationalist army. This article focuses on the
various initiatives undertaken by the United States government and American
charitable organizations, mainly the American Red Cross and Near East Relief,
in order to relieve the victims of the Asia Minor Disaster. In this context, it is
underlined that the United States showed the most tangible interest in that direc-
tion and that the American assistance during the first year after the Disaster
helped save the lives of literally thousands of refugees.
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Introduction
In September 1922, after more than three years of war in Asia Minor, the Greek
army was defeated by the Nationalist Turkish powers led by Mustafa Kemal. The
atrocities from the part of the Turkish armed forces against the Christian popula-
tions of Asia Minor that followed the retreat of the Greek Army resulted in the death
of hundreds of thousands of people1 as well as the destruction of much Christian
property. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Asia Minor, Pontus, and
Eastern Thrace were forced to leave their birthplaces and fled to Greece to find a
safe shelter in order to protect themselves from the advancing Nationalist army of
Mustafa Kemal.2
This article focuses on the various initiatives undertaken by the United States
government and American charitable organizations, mainly the American Red Cross
and Near East Relief, in order to relieve the victims of the Asia Minor Disaster. In
this context, it will be underlined that the United States showed the most tangible
interest in that direction and that the American assistance during the first year after
the Disaster helped save the lives of literally thousands of refugees. This of course is
not a detailed account of the splendid help given by American institutions to Greek
refugees from September 1922 until the summer of the following year; it can be seen
however as a first frame that gives an overall impression of the subject which is yet
to be further and more deeply investigated.
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The Refugee Problem and Early American Initiatives to Confront It
The massive exodus of the Greek population created a huge refugee problem with
which Greece was unable to deal all by itself. More than a million people poured
into Greece,3 most of whom had no practical means of sustenance while at the same
time they faced several fatal epidemics. The problem became even worse as a result of
the fact that, since much of the able-bodied male Greek population of Anatolia
between the productive ages of 18 and 45 were killed or taken prisoners, the refugees
from Asia Minor and Pontus consisted principally of women, children, and old men,4
which meant that many refugee families lacked their natural protectors and were in
even greater difficulty to make a living on their own. The urgent need to relieve the
refugees, which indeed exceeded the capability of the Greek government, meant that
the contribution of the international community was absolutely essential. Thus, in
October 1922, the former Prime Minister and a leading political figure of Greece,
Eleftherios Venizelos, made a public appeal, asking for the active assistance of
the whole world; however, given the fact Europe was recovering from World War I,
Venizelos pointed out that any substantial assistance would have to come from the
United States.5
Venizelos’s appeal to the United States was based on the fact that the American
authorities had already—from the first days of September 1922—shown tangible
interest in the tragic fate of the Greek refugees from Anatolia. As early as September
6 the Unites States High Commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral Mark Lambert
Bristol, in close collaboration with representatives of American relief and benevolent
institutions in Constantinople, had organized a disaster relief committee for Smyrna,6
the biggest city on the west coast of Asia Minor where thousands of refugees from
the Anatolian interior had already poured. At the same time, the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief, the most prominent American charitable institutions
operating in the region, had, as a first practical measure, made available $25,000 for
the assistance of refugees.7
As the situation worsened from day to day, on September 8 the Greek govern-
ment made an urgent appeal to the American Charge´ d’Affaires at Athens, Jefferson
Caffery, asking for the immediate assistance of the US government to help save the
hundreds of thousands of refugees that were assembled in Asia Minor ports. Greece
appeared willing to receive these refugees, but as Greek vessels were employed in
evacuating the retreating Greek troops from Asia Minor, there were no available
means to bring the refugees to Greece. As a result, Athens asked Washington to
provide ships for the safe transportation of the refugees as well as food and tents
for their relief when they would arrive in Greece.8 The fact that on September 9 the
Turkish Army took control of Smyrna meant that the issue had to be solved without
any further delay.9
The problem of food shortage had been immediately understood by the members
of the representatives of US humanitarian organizations, such as the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief, which were engaged with the relief of refugees at
Smyrna. In fact, the institutions of this kind were in practice the only institutions
working on the spot for the relief of refugees.10 In this context, Admiral Bristol was
pointing out ‘‘ the extreme gravity of the condition of refugees at Smyrna and else-
where,’’ about 300,000 of whom were entirely destitute—there was practically no
hope that they would be able to return to their homes as their personal safety could
not be secured; moreover, the situation was predicted to become even worse owing to
the approach of winter.11
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The gravity of the problem made the representatives of the American Red Cross
and the Near East Relief hesitant as to whether private charity alone would be
adequate for the relief of the hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees. According to
these two organizations, all money available would be used up within two or three
weeks and the situation would still be as pressing at the end of that time ‘‘ unless
this breathing spell were used to put into action some comprehensive scheme to
reduce and ultimately solve the problem.’’ Thus, the American Red Cross and the
Near East Relief pointed out that government action by the Western Allies was
absolutely essential.12 Admiral Bristol was also entirely in accord with the view
that private charity alone was quite unequal to the situation. Moreover, he sug-
gested that American relief activities should be restricted to Anatolia in giving aid
to refugees who were awaiting evacuation, and that ‘‘ the task of evacuating these
refugees and providing for them at their ultimate destinations should be urged
upon Greek and Allied Governments’’.13
However, as the rest of the Allied governments (namely those of Great Britain,
France, and Italy) were reluctant to take any practical measure for the assistance of
the refugees, the US government decided to act by itself. By September 20 neither
the Italian nor the British High Commissioners at Constantinople had received any
instructions from their respective governments and as a result no action for the
assistance of the refugees had been taken.14 According to press reports, the only
relief work being carried out in Smyrna was conducted by the American Red Cross,
the Near East Relief, and United States Navy Destroyers in the region and the
only foreign forces ashore were American sailors.15 Furthermore, Admiral Bristol
instructed the dispatch of yet another destroyer at Smyrna to assist with the evacua-
tion of the refugees whose lives were in great danger:
Without waiting for the allies to act and in view of the unexpected evacuation of
refugees to the interior from Smyrna, we will take all possible steps to meet the
present emergency and the latter facts induced me to give orders to use the limited
number of destroyers I have available to assist in the evacuation.16
The situation for the refugees continued to deteriorate rapidly. Those who were
still trying to find a means to leave Asia Minor and find shelter in Greece were facing
the immediate danger of dying either because of the massacres by the Kemalist forces
or because of hunger and diseases. Things were not much better for the refugees who
had managed to escape the slaughter as they were almost equally exposed to the
danger of hunger and diseases. Caffery from Athens reported that the Greek govern-
ment was in fact unable to undertake the extremely difficult task of housing and
feeding the refugees. As money and food were badly needed, Caffery recommended
that American relief organizations should urgently send assistance to Greece.17
Caffery’s appeal was in accordance with the initiatives of his government. In a
telegram sent on September 21 to Admiral Bristol, the Under Secretary of State,
William Phillips, described in detail the steps which had been taken by the United
States to prepare for extended relief work. Among these were the following: Presi-
dent Warren G. Harding had asked Congress to appropriate $200,000 for the relief
and possible repatriation of destitute American citizens living in Asia Minor; in
addition to the $25,000 already advanced, the American Red Cross had informally
indicated willingness to make a further advance for a possible total of $100,000;
the Near East Relief had addressed a general appeal throughout the United States
for an emergency fund and in addition to funds resulting from this appeal it was
estimated that it would be able to make advances for a possible total of $200,000;
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6:1 April 2011
100
finally, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) had advanced $10,000 and
there was a possibility of further advances.18
For his part, Admiral Bristol suggested that the only practical means that the
Greek government could use to undertake the enormous task of refugee relief was
by immediately demobilizing the Greek army. This would mean that the Greek
government could handle all the relief work in Greece and that American relief
organizations would not be drawn into operations in Greece that would involve large
expenditures of money and more or less permanent activities. In the meantime,
Admiral Bristol, in close coordination with members of various American charitable
organizations, had taken certain measures to facilitate the safe evacuation and relief
of refugees in Smyrna, Moudania, Bursa, and Rodosto.19
The gravity and the urgency of the situation were so overwhelming that the need
for immediate action was essential. Thus, despite the fact that the US government
agreed with Admiral Bristol that the responsibility for the evacuation and the relief
of Greek refugees rested primarily with Greece and the Allied governments, the
Greek Red Cross had already made a direct appeal for help to the American Red
Cross and the Near East Relief was contemplating a possible extension of its work
to Greece.20 At the same time, the Disaster Relief Committee in Smyrna, which in
fact represented all of the American relief organizations in the wider region, was
issuing no less than 20,000 rations of food per day in Smyrna, US destroyers were
helping with the evacuation of Greeks from the city, and flour was sent to various
places (such as Smyrna, Rodosto, and Mytilene) where many refugees were located.
Moreover, contributions from different associations collected by the Disaster Relief
Committee amounted to $85,000.21
Private Charity in Action
By the end of September 1922, through the instrumentality of various American
relief associations, funds and supplies summing approximately $300,000 had been
made available for the relief of Greek refugees. Meanwhile, American emergency
relief units continued to work on the ground, mainly in places where huge numbers
of refugees had poured in on their way to Greece, such as Smyrna, Moudania, Bursa,
and Rodosto, and US war vessels continued to help in the difficult task of the evacua-
tion of refugees.22 Nevertheless, no matter how great American help was, there were
still many things to be done so that the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees
could be saved. Thus, in his statement issued on 9 October 1922 regarding relief
work in the Near East, President Harding announced that due to an emergency
appeal the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief would jointly continue
their relief efforts and that a special fund under the name Near East Emergency
Fund would be created and collect donations from every part of the United States.23
The American Red Cross was to be in charge of the operations in Greece while the
Near East Relief would concentrate its activities in Turkey where thousands of
Greeks, among whom there were many orphans, were still trying to find a safe way
to Greece.
In fact, the American Red Cross was immediately prepared to send a mission
to Athens to assist in the administration of relief measures to the numerous Greek
refugees, provided that (1) this mission would be approved by the Greek authorities
and (2) these authorities would be prepared to offer full protection for personnel and
provide storage and transportation facilities for the necessary supplies.24 This was
an offer that Athens could not refuse. Thus, the Greek government was delighted
to express its deep gratitude to the American Red Cross for its generous offer and
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promised to provide all the desired facilities25 to help with the relief work. In
fact, the situation in Greece was so critical and the means available to the Greek
authorities for the relief of refugees were so insufficient that, when the first repre-
sentatives of the American Red Cross arrived in Athens, the Greek government was
actually considering handing over to the American Red Cross the entire charge of
the Ministry of Public Assistance.26 Of course, the American Red Cross was in no
position to undertake such a responsibility; however, the help provided by this as
well as other American charitable organizations was so significant that in January
1923 the newly crowned King of the Greeks George II expressed his personal thanks
to President Harding for America’s generous assistance.27
Indeed, the Relief Commission of the American Red Cross established in Greece
since October 1922 did marvelous work as far as the relief of Greek refugees was
concerned. The degree of its contribution is evident in the fact that in March 1923
more than 533,000 refugees received food supplies daily and about 291,000 had been
inoculated against diseases such as typhus and cholera by agents of the American Red
Cross,28 not to mention the clothes and other necessary supplies that were distributed
among refugees. However, it was evident that the American charitable organizations,
mainly the American Red Cross, could not carry out the extremely difficult task of
relieving the hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees who had found shelter on
Greek soil for much longer. As a result, in late January 1923 the American Red
Cross Commissioner for Greece, Colonel William N. Haskell, suggested that the
American Red Cross should cease its operations in June of the same year and make
an early announcement of its intention so that plenty of time would be given ‘‘ to the
Greek government and all others concerned to make their arrangements properly.’’29
In accordance with Colonel Haskell’s suggestions, the American Red Cross
decided to terminate its emergency work in Greece by 30 June 1923. This decision
was taken not only because it was difficult to find further resources, but also on the
ground that the solution of the refugee problem in Greece could not lie in measures
of temporary relief alone but rather in measures of a permanent character that
would enable the refugees to be absorbed as promptly as possible into the normal
economic life of Greece. In other words, it would be advisable for the refugees not to
depend for much longer on charity but rather to become self-sufficient. For the same
reasons, the Near East Relief had also decided to terminate its emergency relief for
adult refugees and concentrate its efforts mainly on orphans and children in need.30
The Greek government wished to persuade the American Red Cross to continue
its relief operations after 30 June 1923. In fact, in late May 1923 the Greek govern-
ment made a formal request of the kind to the American Red Cross, stating that
Greece would not be able to undertake the care of refugees until six months after
the signature of the peace treaty with Turkey which, at the time of the submission
of the request, had not yet been concluded.31 The American Red Cross, however,
was not willing to change its decision and the Vice President of the Central Com-
mittee in Charge of International Relations of the American Red Cross, Ernest P.
Bichnell, explained why:
I feel that it is important to make it necessary that Greece shall be made to feel her
full responsibility in the circumstances. Our withdrawal should have a tendency to
compel the breaking up of the concentration camps and a wider distribution of the
refugees throughout the country. Without the breaking up no progress can be made
toward the absorption of the refugees into the normal population or their establish-
ment on self support. Possibly, too, the pressure of the full burden of responsibility
for the refugees will have a wholesome effect on governmental policies.32
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In this context, the US government had already asked the governments of Great
Britain, France, and Italy to provide substantial help to Greece so that the latter
could cope with the relief of refugees.33 This American initiative was additional proof
that the American officials were justly convinced that the solution of the refugee
problem did not lie in measures of temporary relief, but in measures of a more
permanent character.
As it had in good time been announced, the American Red Cross officially termi-
nated its relief work in Greece on 30 June 1923. Four days earlier the Municipality
of Athens had organized an official ceremony in which King George II, the Greek
Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, and other officials thanked the members
of the American Red Cross for their invaluable help.34 Moreover, by mid-August of
the same year the Near East Relief ended its relief work for adults35 and continued
its actions only for orphans and children in need. However, before closing its opera-
tions, the American Red Cross had distributed rations of food to the refugees that
would be sufficient for one month or, in some cases, even for two months, while a
small amount of clothing and child-feeding supplies were left to be distributed by
the local Greek authorities. As a result, even as it withdrew from Greece, the
American Red Cross provided relief for at least one month longer.36 Moreover, with
the American stocks left over and given the excellent crop prospects, American
officials estimated that the Greek authorities could meet the needs of refugees until
November 1923.37
Conclusion
It is not easy to sufficiently underline the importance of the American charitable
initiatives from September 1922 until the summer of the following year. Indeed, the
lives of hundreds of thousands of Greek refugees from Asia Minor, Pontus, and
Eastern Thrace were saved thanks to the humanitarian initiatives of American
charitable organizations, mainly the American Red Cross and the Near East Relief.
These two organizations practically single-handedly undertook the extremely difficult
task of providing aid on the spot to Greek refugees who otherwise would have likely
been condemned to death by diseases, malnutrition, and other hardships. The
gravity of the situation demanded immediate and effective action and the United
States was by far the first to respond to the Greek appeals for help.
Sometimes the numbers speak for themselves even though they cannot always
describe the splendor of philanthropy. The total cost of the relief work undertaken by
the American Red Cross for the period from October 1922 to 30 June 1923 amounted
to the astonishing $2,605,696.09.38 During that period of time, the American Red
Cross took care of the feeding and nursing of more than 500,000 Greek refugees,
and the Near East Relief helped in the relief of several thousand Greeks, including
many orphans, who had not yet left Asia Minor and were trying to find a safe way of
going to Greece. After the withdrawal of the American Red Cross from Greece, it was
estimated that the Greek government would need about 12 to 15 million drachmas
(that is approximately $375,000 to $470,000) per month in order to only feed the
refugees who were in no position to sustain themselves.39 It is quite obvious that,
without this assistance, the Greek government would not have been able to cope
with the extremely heavy burden of providing the means of survival to hundreds of
thousands of Greek refugees and it is easy to imagine what the fate of many of them
would have been if in the critical first months after the Asia Minor Disaster the
United States had not offered its generous help to Greece.
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